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Note 
Roadside Saliva Swab Testing: A Solution to Drugged 
Driving or a Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right 
to Privacy? 
DEMERY J. ORMROD 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court recognized a distinction 
between substitute methods for testing blood alcohol contents: pursuant to a DUI 
arrest, breathalyzer tests may be performed without a warrant, whereas blood 
draws (even if pursued for the exact same reason) may not. My focus here, in this 
Note, is on roadside saliva swab testing, a method used by police to determine 
whether a driver is driving under the influence of cannabis. Ultimately, this Note 
argues for warranted saliva swab testing, resting on a straightforward analogy: A 
is more like B than it is like C—or, in this particular case, saliva swabs are more 
like blood draws than breathalyzer tests. And, for this reason, as with blood draws, 
officers should be required to procure a warrant prior to conducting a roadside 
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Roadside Saliva Swab Testing: A Solution to Drugged 
Driving or a Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right 
to Privacy? 
DEMERY J. ORMROD* 
“Nowhere in the Bill of Rights are the words ‘unless 
inconvenient’ to be found.” 
– A.E. Samaan 
INTRODUCTION 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court held that police must 
obtain a warrant before taking a blood sample from someone arrested for 
driving under the influence, but warrantless breathalyzer tests, in the same 
circumstance, are permitted.1 The basis for this distinction was twofold: (1) 
whereas a blood test is necessarily intrusive, a breathalyzer test does not 
compromise one’s bodily integrity,2 and (2) blood contains a wealth of 
information, thus implicating Fourth Amendment privacy concerns, whereas 
breath does not.3 In the wake of Birchfield, a new constitutional puzzle has 
emerged. Namely, should warrants be required for roadside saliva swab 
testing, a police tactic frequently used in connection with arrests for driving 
under the influence of cannabis?4 Or, framing the puzzle analogically: are 
 
* J.D. Candidate at the University of Connecticut School of Law. I would like to extend a very 
special thank you to Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez for his guidance, advice, mentorship, and shared 
Fourth Amendment enthusiasm. I would also like to thank the members of the Connecticut Law Review 
for their thoughtful advice and feedback. Above all, thank you to my friends and family, especially my 
Mom for her unwavering support and encouragement; my Dad, my first family member to take on the 
arduous task of reading this Note in its entirety; and Matt, for always believing in me. Finally, I would 
like to dedicate this Note to my nieces and nephew—Kennedy, Sebastian, and Amelia.  
1 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016). 
2 Id. at 2176–78. 
3 Id. at 2177–78. 
4 Except as used in source titles and direct quotes, I will use the words “cannabis” and “weed” as 
opposed to the oft-used term “marijuana.” Several sources report the inherently racist history behind the 
word. According to NPR, “‘marijuana’ came into popular usage in the U.S. in the early 20th century 
because anti-cannabis factions wanted to underscore the drug’s ‘Mexican-ness.’ It was meant to play off 
of anti-immigrant sentiments.” Matt Thompson, The Mysterious History of ‘Marijuana’, NPR (July 22, 
2013, 11:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/07/14/201981025/the-mysterious-
history-of-marijuana. The drug’s racist background persists in the disproportionality of cannabis arrests, 
as a 2013 report by the ACLU reported that Black Americans are 3.73 times more likely than white 
Americans to be arrested for cannabis possession. ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND 
WHITE 17 (2013). For additional resources, see generally ISAAC CAMPOS, HOME GROWN: MARIJUANA 
AND THE ORIGINS OF MEXICO’S WAR ON DRUGS (2012); Eric Schlosser, Reefer Madness, ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 1994), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/08/reefer-madness/303476/.  
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saliva swabs more like blood draws or like breathalyzer tests (and why)? 
That is the question I address here. And my answer, in short, is that blood 
draws offer the closer analogy, counseling in favor of warrants for roadside 
saliva swab tests.  
The saliva swab test emerged as a response to the increased legalization 
of medicinal and recreational cannabis.5 Put simply, the saliva swab test is a 
roadside test in which a police officer uses a cheek swab to extract saliva 
from a driver’s mouth.6 The saliva sample is subsequently placed in a portable 
machine used to detect whether a particular controlled substance—in this 
case, cannabis—is present in the driver’s system.7 Largely attributable to the 
lack of federal direction, states have also variably developed procedures 
regarding roadside saliva testing. But common to all states that have 
implemented these tests, thus far, is the absence of a warrant requirement.8 
States that have adopted the test typically utilize the saliva swab as part of a 
twelve-step sobriety test. “[T]he oral swab helps establish one more link in 
the evidence chain to get a warrant to get a blood draw,”9 which, according 
to the Birchfield Court, does require the procurement of a warrant.10   
Despite concerns about the unreliability of these saliva tests, which has 
been a topic of discussion among other commentators and researchers,11 this 
 
5 In fifteen states and Washington, D.C., adults over the age of twenty-one may legally use cannabis 
recreationally, and cannabis is legal for medicinal purposes in thirty-six states. Jeremy Berke, Shayanne 
Gal & Yeji Jesse Lee, All the States Where Marijuana Is Legal – and 5 More that Voted to Legalize It in 
November, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2021, 2:49 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-
states-2018. 




8 In Illinois, the test is conducted as part of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test. Robert McCoppin, 
Cops Want to Know Who’s Driving While Stoned. Tests Are Being Developed, but Level of Impairment 
After Smoking Weed Is Still Hard to Measure., CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/marijuana/illinois/ct-marijuana-roadside-drug-test-20191025-
zr2ouoci6jfxdnjnjcifhtv3s4-story.html (“Police are not trying to use the device to determine how much 
THC a person has in their system, nor whether they are impaired. They are merely looking for evidence 
to support probable cause to arrest the person.”). However, since the saliva swab testing is still merely in 
its pilot stage, drivers can refuse to submit to testing. Id. Similarly, in Michigan, if a driver suspected of 
being impaired is stopped, an officer may, as part of the Twelve-Step Sobriety Test, require a driver to 
submit a mouth swab for testing. Sonia Khaleel, Michigan State Police to Begin Roadside Drug Testing 
Program that Includes Mouth Swabs for Oral Screenings, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019, 4:00 
PM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2019/10/01/michigan-state-police-to-begin-road
side-drug-testing-program-that-includes-mouth-swabs-for-oral-screenings. Michigan diverges from 
Illinois, however, because in Michigan, a driver’s refusal to submit to the swab test will result in a civil 
infraction. Id. In California, upon reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), 
an officer can request a buccal swab from the driver. William Weinberg, DUI Drugs Roadside Mouth 
Swab Test, ORANGE CNTY. DUI LAW. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.orangecountyduilawyerblog
.com/dui-drugs-roadside-mouth-swab-test/ (“A positive result almost guarantees the driver will be 
arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs and required to submit to a blood test.”).  
9 Eric Baerren, Mt. Pleasant Participates in Roadside Drug Testing Program, MORNING SUN (Oct. 
8, 2019), https://www.themorningsun.com/news/copscourts/mt-pleasant-participates-in-roadside-drug-
testing-program/article_e3dc3d88-e93b-11e9-871f-878771574e6a.html. 
10 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). 
11 See RICHARD P. COMPTON, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
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Note will primarily address the constitutional concerns surrounding 
warrantless roadside saliva swab tests. Though these tests are typically not 
conducted incident-to-arrest (or, after lawful arrest, which was the case in 
Birchfield), but instead prior to arrest, I will nonetheless utilize the 
framework employed by the United States Supreme Court in Birchfield v. 
North Dakota to assess their constitutionality, as the intimate nature of a 
saliva test raises the same concerns regarding blood testing considered by 
the Court in Birchfield. Ultimately, this Note will argue that extracting 
saliva, like extracting blood, is intrusive and provides a sample that law 
enforcement can preserve, rendering saliva swab testing impermissible 
absent a valid warrant.  
This Note will begin, in Part I, by examining the current state of the law 
on drugged driving, noting the absence of federal standards and briefly 
describing various states’ approaches. This Part will also detail saliva swab 
testing, including its inception in the United States, the role it plays in 
drugged driving arrests, the testing devices and tools employed, and, most 
notably, states’ implementation of warrantless roadside saliva swab testing. 
In Part II, I will introduce the applicable Fourth Amendment framework and 
describe the legal background upon which Birchfield v. North Dakota was 
decided. This Part will proceed with a discussion of Birchfield, its twin 
pillars, and the Court’s novel concern with DNA privacy and the 
preservability of a DNA sample. Next, in Part III, leaning on empirical data, 
coupled with the Birchfield Court’s concern surrounding informational 
dynamics, I will argue that saliva testing is more like blood testing than 
breath testing and, therefore, should be treated like a blood draw and may 
only be obtained after a warrant is issued. In this Part, I will address 
counterarguments and also briefly mention other recognized concerns with 
saliva testing, including its unreliability and potential for Equal Protection 
violations. Finally, in Part IV, I will propose solutions to the drugged driving 
problem that do not raise similar constitutional concerns. Among these 
solutions, guided by the Birchfield Court, I urge law enforcement to adopt 
less intrusive means. As legalization continues to become a conspicuous 
reality, it is imperative that policymakers, state governments, and law 
enforcement not shy away from innovative and creative solutions for 
purposes of convenience, but instead employ means and methods to preserve 
and protect the privacy interest guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  
 
DOT HS 812 440, MARIJUANA-IMPAIRED DRIVING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 27 (2017) [hereinafter 
MARIJUANA-IMPAIRED DRIVING] (“[T]he poor correlation of THC level in the blood or oral fluid with 
impairment precludes using THC blood or oral fluid levels as an indicator of driver impairment.”); 
Gemma Sapwell, ‘Passive Smoking’ Defence Clears Woman of Drug Driving as Research Casts Doubt 
on Roadside Testing, ABC NEWS (May 22, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-
23/study-casts-doubt-on-roadside-cannabis-testing/11104544 (noting that research conducted by Sydney 
University indicates that roadside saliva tests produced both false positives and false negatives).  
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW ON CANNABIS-IMPAIRED DRIVING 
A. Absence of a Federal Standard 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a 
branch of the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) charged 
with enforcing vehicle performance standards,12 has long studied alcohol 
and its effects on driving.13 After extensive research on the effect of alcohol 
on an individual’s central nervous system, the NHTSA determined that “[a]t 
a BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of .08 grams of alcohol per deciliter 
(g/dL) of blood, crash risk increases exponentially.”14 Subsequently, all fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico adopted the .08 standard 
and have made it illegal to drive with a BAC of .08 or higher.15 
As compared to the commonly known .08 BAC standard for drunk 
driving, there is no analogous federal standard for driving under the 
influence of drugs (DUID) cases.16 Unlike alcohol, which is absorbed in the 
blood stream and metabolizes at a steady rate, the psychoactive component 
of cannabis, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), is fat soluble.17 This means that, 
once ingested, THC can be stored in the body’s fatty tissues and released 
into the blood stream long after ingestion.18 Because of its fat solubility, 
studies dedicated to the relationship between THC levels and a user’s degree 
of impairment have shown that the amount of THC found in a driver’s blood 
and the degree of impairment do not appear to be closely associated.19 For 
this reason, it is seemingly impossible to develop a per se level of 
impairment standard to guide states, as well as to determine who is truly 
driving while impaired. This variability in the effects of THC, coupled with 
the NHTSA’s admission that the topic is ridden with a “relative lack of 
research,”20 does not bode well for states attempting to effectuate DUID laws. 
 
12 About NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.nhtsa.gov/about-nhtsa (last visited Jan. 3, 
2020). 
13 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 812 864, 
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2018 DATA: ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING 1 (2019) (explaining the NHTSA’s 
2018 alcohol-impaired driving report, including the number of alcohol-impaired fatalities, the economic 
cost of alcohol-impaired crashes, and other pertinent trends).   
14 Drunk Driving, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
15 Id. On December 30, 2018, Utah changed its per se limit from .08 to .05 BAC. Nicole Nixon, Utah 
First in the Nation to Lower Its DUI Limit to .05 Percent, NPR (Dec. 26, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/26/679833767/utah-first-in-the-nation-to-lower-its-dui-limit-to-05-percent. 
16 See Angus Chen, Why Is It So Hard to Test Whether Drivers Are Stoned?, NPR (Feb. 9, 2016, 
12:27 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/02/09/466147956/why-its-so-hard-to-make-
a-solid-test-for-driving-while-stoned (“But marijuana isn’t like [alcohol]. The height of your intoxication 
isn’t at the moment when blood THC levels peak, and the high doesn’t rise and fall uniformly based on 
how much THC leaves and enters your bodily fluids . . . . The instinct . . . is to come up with a law that 
parallels the 0.08 BAC standard for alcohol. ‘Everyone is looking for one number . . . . And it’s almost 
impossible to come up with one number.’”). 
17 MARIJUANA-IMPAIRED DRIVING, supra note 11, at 4.  
18 Id. “Some studies have detected THC in the blood at 30 days post ingestion.” Id. (citation omitted).  
19 Id. at 7. 
20 Id. 
 
2021] ROADSIDE SALIVA SWAB TESTING 515 
This absence of research is likely exacerbated by the fact that cannabis 
is federally illegal.21 According to the NHTSA, because cannabis is a 
Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act, extra precautions 
must be taken when researching it.22 Despite admitted gray areas in research, 
studies have shown that cannabis can have serious effects on an individual’s 
driving abilities, as THC can “lower a driver’s vigilance, slow reaction 
times, alter perceptions of time and distance, and affect the driver’s balance 
and ability to ‘track lanes.’”23 In sum, various research studies have 
demonstrated that cannabis has the potential to impair driving-related skills, 
yet there is a glaring lack of research to inform state legislation. Despite 
cannabis’s potentially dangerous impacts on traffic safety, recognized by the 
NHTSA,24 legalization continues, and states are forced to respond by 
enacting their own laws to combat cannabis-impaired driving.   
B. The State Approaches: From Zero-Tolerance to Per Se and Beyond 
State laws on cannabis-impaired driving vary widely. Five states, 
including Washington and Illinois, have created per se laws, which 
“prohibit[] driving with a detectable amount of THC in the body that exceeds 
the legal limit.”25 The per se limit is typically five ng/ml of THC, though in 
some states, the threshold is as minimal as one ng/ml.26 Twelve states, 
including Utah, Arizona, and Pennsylvania, have implemented zero-
tolerance laws, which “prohibit[] driving with any amount of THC and/or its 
metabolites in the body.”27 Because of the chemical properties of cannabis 
(specifically, its fat solubility, which allows it to remain in a user’s system 
long after ingestion), these per se limits and zero-tolerance laws are 
particularly problematic and may incriminate drivers who are not actually 
high.28 Indeed, the American Automobile Association (AAA) “concluded 
 
21 Jean Lotus, Drugged Driving: Traffic Stops Changing in Pot-Legal States, UPI (July 25, 2019, 
3:00 AM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2019/07/25/Drugged-driving-Traffic-stops-changing-
in-pot-legal-states/6121563804207/.  
22 MARIJUANA-IMPAIRED DRIVING, supra note 11, at 6–7. Extra precautions may include obtaining 
a government license to store and use cannabis, meeting the security requirements for storage, securing 
necessary documentation, and disposing properly. Id. at 7. 
23 Lotus, supra note 21.    
24 MARIJUANA-IMPAIRED DRIVING, supra note 11, at 11–12. 
25 Drugged Driving: Marijuana-Impaired Driving, NCSL (Mar. 8, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/resear
ch/transportation/drugged-driving-overview.aspx [hereinafter Drugged Driving].  
26 JAMES LYNCH & LUCIAN MCMAHON, INS. INFO. INST., A ROCKY ROAD SO FAR: RECREATIONAL 
MARIJUANA AND IMPAIRED DRIVING 13 (2019), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/marijua
naanddui-wp-031119.pdf. 
27 Drugged Driving, supra note 25.  
28 LYNCH & MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 13. Importantly, the study notes that the opposite may be 
true; because high levels of THC dissipate quickly before impairment subsides, impaired drivers may not 
always be prosecuted. Id. “One study found that only 10 percent of its participants would have been 
prosecuted for impaired driving, even though many self-reported recent marijuana use.” Id. (footnote omitted).  
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that ‘a quantitative threshold for per se laws for THC following cannabis use 
cannot be scientifically supported.’”29  
The majority of states employ “under the influence DUID”-style laws, 
which “require[] the driver to be under the influence of or affected by 
THC.”30 Officers in these states use behavioral markers to determine whether 
a driver is impaired.31 But this method, too, is flawed, as “[t]here is currently 
no scientifically sound roadside impairment test”—such as a breathalyzer 
equivalent—to empirically evaluate whether a driver is impaired.32 This 
absence in technology and resources to aid law enforcement has led some to 
argue for a verifiable assessment to measure a driver’s THC levels.  
The solution? Saliva swab testing.33  
C. Introducing Saliva Swab Testing 
Though roadside saliva testing technology first premiered in the United 
States in 2009,34 its presence has steadily increased within the past three 
years, emerging in major cities like San Diego,35 Boston,36 and, most 
recently, Carol Stream,37 a suburb of Chicago. In these cities, saliva swab 
testing is generally administered as part of a standard field sobriety test, of 
which the saliva swab testing is simply one component.38  
Roadside saliva swab testing generally proceeds as follows: when an 
officer stops a driver, suspecting they are under the influence of cannabis, 
the officer—trained to recognize the symptoms of impairment—will look 
for “indicators that a driver is high, such as an unsafe driving maneuver, 
bloodshot eyes, the odor of marijuana and blank stares.”39 Once there is 
ample physical evidence to support a suspicion of drug use, the officer may 
then request to perform a field sobriety test, including a saliva swab test.40 
 
29 Id. at 14 (quoting BARRY LOGAN, SHERRI L. KACINKO & DOUGLAS J. BEIRNESS, AAA FOUND. 
FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, AN EVALUATION OF DATA FROM DRIVERS ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE IN RELATION TO PER SE LIMITS FOR CANNABIS 3 (2016), http://publicaffairsresources.aaa.
biz/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Evaluation-of-Drivers-in-Relation-to-Per-Se-Report-FINAL.pdf).  
30 Drugged Driving, supra note 25. Unique to Colorado is the permissible inference law, which 
“applies if THC is identified in a driver’s blood in quantities of 5ng/ml or higher. If so, it is permissible 
to assume that the driver was under the influence.” Id.  
31 LYNCH & MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 14.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Kristina Davis, Police Are Using New Mouth-Swab Tests to Nab Drivers Under the Influence of 
Marijuana and Other Drugs, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lan
ow/la-me-mouth-swab-drugs-test-police-pot-20170317-story.html. 
35 Id.  
36 Mary Markos, State Police Testing Saliva Swab to Catch Stoned Drivers, BOS. HERALD (Aug. 9, 
2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.bostonherald.com/2018/08/09/state-police-testing-saliva-swab-to-catch-
stoned-drivers/.  
37 McCoppin, supra note 8. 
38 Id. 
39 Davis, supra note 34. 
40 Id.; McCoppin, supra note 8. Typically, police departments are equipped with one of two devices 
to perform the testing: the Dräger DrugTest 5000 or the SoToxa Mobile Test System. For more 
information on the Dräger DrugTest 5000, see Dräger DrugTest 5000, DRÄGER, https://www.draeger.c
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Ultimately, after performing the field sobriety test (and the saliva swab 
component), police make a probable cause determination. If police have 
probable cause to arrest the driver, they may apply for a warrant for a blood 
draw, which will determine the driver’s actual level of impairment.41  
Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to implement penalties for those 
they deem uncooperative drivers. In San Diego, a driver’s refusal to submit 
to saliva testing permits an officer to force the driver to submit to a blood 
test,42 and in Michigan, failure to submit to the roadside saliva test will result 
in a civil infraction.43 Though each state has implemented these roadside 
saliva tests with slight alterations, one thing remains common among them 
all: state laws do not require officers to procure a warrant before proceeding 
with the buccal swab.  
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
AND EXAMINATION OF PRECEDENT 
A. The Constitutional Framework: A Buccal Swab as a “Search” 
Protected by the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment, binding on the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment,44 reads, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause . . . .”45 Its central purpose is to prevent the government 
from conducting overly broad, open-ended searches, whereby law enforcement 
officers can essentially search any person for any purpose at any time.46  
According to the United States Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Association, extracting a blood sample or administering 
a breath test during a traffic stop is a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.47 Because virtually any invasion into the human body will 
work as an “‘intrusion upon cherished personal security’ that is subject to 
 
om/en-us_us/Applications/Products/Alcohol-and-Drug-Testing/Drug-Testing-Devices/DrugTest-
5000#benefits (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). For more information on the SoToxa Mobile Test System, see 
A New Era for Roadside Testing: SoToxaTM Mobile Test System, ABBOTT (2020), https://ensur.invmed.
com/ensur/contentAction.aspx?key=ensur.329259.S2R4E4A3.20180424.4770.4178856. 
41 McCoppin, supra note 8. 
42 Davis, supra note 34. 
43 Brad Devereaux, Kent, Washtenaw Among 5 Counties Selected for Roadside Drug Testing, 
MLIVE (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.mlive.com/news/2017/11/kent_washtenaw_among_5_countie.html 
(“Refusal to submit to a preliminary oral fluid analysis upon lawful demand of a police officer is a civil 
infraction.”).  
44 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–57 (1961).  
45 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
46 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement is aimed at preventing unnecessary, overly general searches and explaining that the 
requirement arose out of colonists’ anger towards warrants that allowed for “general, exploratory 
rummaging in a person’s belongings”).  
47 Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989). 
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constitutional scrutiny,”48 “using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a 
person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is [also] a search.”49 
Even in the realm of DNA extraction, it has been recognized that 
intrusion upon an individual’s privacy is sometimes warranted and, in fact, 
necessary because of some other countervailing interest. Whether the 
government may infringe upon the Fourth Amendment right to privacy 
depends upon “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”50 Courts have 
developed several tests to assess the reasonableness of a particular search, 
and the applicable test largely depends on the circumstances of the search.51  
For a given search or seizure to be reasonable, ordinarily, “the 
government must obtain a search warrant.”52 The Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement officers demonstrate, to a 
neutral magistrate, that they have probable cause to believe that their search 
will reveal evidence of a crime.53 However, a warrant and probable cause 
are not always necessary for a search to be deemed “reasonable.”54 In certain 
circumstances, even DNA can be collected absent a warrant because “a 
person’s privacy expectation has decreased or the government’s need is 
increased.”55 In these cases, the reasonableness of the search is determined 
by weighing “the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” against 
“the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy,”56 
and the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement may be circumvented. 
In Missouri v. McNeely, the United States Supreme Court was called to 
answer whether the warrant requirement could be circumvented in drunk 
driving cases.57 More specifically, the question presented was whether the 
natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes what the 
Court termed a “per se exigency,” justifying the warrantless taking of a 
blood sample.58 The State argued for a per se categorical rule, presenting 
evidence that the percentage of alcohol in an individual’s body decreased by 
approximately .015% to .02% per hour once the alcohol was fully absorbed.59 
Therefore, said the State, the significant delay in testing—between 
 
48 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968)).  
49 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013). 
50 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.  
51 Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for One Purpose Is 
Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1300 (2011).  
52 Id. 
53 See King, 569 U.S. at 467 (“As ratified, the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause forbids a 
warrant to ‘issue’ except ‘upon probable cause,’ and requires that it be ‘particula[r]’ (which is to say, 
individualized) to ‘the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’”) (alteration in 
original). 
54 Lowenberg, supra note 51, at 1300. “For example, if a person consents to being searched, then 
nothing else—neither warrant nor probable cause—is necessary.” Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).  
57 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).  
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 152. 
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apprehending the individual and obtaining a warrant—would negatively 
impact the blood test’s probative value.60 The plurality wrote that even the 
natural evanescence of alcohol could not always constitute an exigency 
justifying an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for 
nonconsensual blood testing, thereby rejecting a categorical rule.61 Instead, 
the plurality noted that warrantless testing of drunk driving suspects could 
apply in “exigent circumstances,”62 the exigency of which must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis depending on the totality of the circumstances.63  
The McNeely plurality emphatically pronounced its dedication to the 
Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees, making clear that “the Fourth 
Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad categorical 
approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a context where 
significant privacy interests are at stake.”64 Practically then, for law 
enforcement, procuring a warrant before a blood draw is the general rule and 
warrantless testing is the exception.65 The plurality’s firm affirmation of an 
individual’s right to privacy set the stage for its subsequent decision in 
Birchfield, which ultimately addressed a gap in McNeely and reiterated the 
sacredness of an individual’s bodily right to privacy. In McNeely, the Court 
deliberately did not address potential justifications for warrantless testing of 
drunk driving suspects, except for the exigent circumstances exception. In 
Birchfield, the Court was called to determine whether warrantless alcohol 
testing to determine a driver’s level of impairment, incident to drunk driving 
arrests, violates the Fourth Amendment.66 
B. The Birchfield “Pillars”: DNA Privacy Versus the State Interest 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court was called to resolve 
yet another potential circumvention of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement. In Birchfield, a consolidation of three cases involving alleged 
drunk driving arrestees, the Court was tasked with determining how the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine67 applies to breath and blood tests.68 
 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 165. 
62 Id. at 156. 
63 Id. at 158. 
64 Id. Note, here, that the plurality wrote that even though drivers are accorded less privacy in their 
automobiles (due to the compelling government need to regulate motor vehicle safety), this does not 
diminish a driver’s privacy interest in preventing law enforcement from drawing the driver’s blood. Id. 
at 159. The plurality also dismissed the argument that the importance of combatting the drunk driving 
epidemic justifies departing from the warrant requirement. Id. at 159–60. 
65 Jordan D. Santo, Comment, Waiting is Warranted: Giving Meaning to the Supreme Court’s 
Ruling in Missouri v. McNeely, 24 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 247, 266 (2014).  
66 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166–67 (2016). 
67 The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine is defined as comprising two separate propositions. “The 
first is that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest. The second 
is that a search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee.” United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
68 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172. 
 
520 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2 
Accordingly, the Birchfield Court evaluated the constitutionality of both 
warrantless blood and breath tests incident to drunk driving to resolve 
whether states could criminalize a driver’s refusal to submit to BAC testing.  
Ultimately, to reach its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits 
warrantless breath tests incident to drunk driving arrests but not warrantless 
blood tests,69 the Court employed the framework set out in Riley v. 
California.70 The Riley test required the Court to balance two factors, 
hereinafter referred to as the “Twin Pillars of Birchfield”: (1) an individual’s 
privacy interest and (2) the government’s need for warrantless searches in 
order to promote its own legitimate interests.71 For the purposes of this Note, 
the governmental interest (in “preserving the safety . . . of public highways” 
and deterring individuals from driving under the influence72) will only be 
addressed briefly,73 as these governmental interests are common among all 
drunk driving or drug-impaired driving cases. Clearly, in the realm of 
cannabis-impaired driving, identical governmental interests exist.   
The subsequent sections in this Note are devoted to Birchfield Pillar 
One—the desire to preserve and protect an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
privacy guarantees. The following subsection will parse out the Birchfield 
Court’s treatment of blood and breath testing, paralleling the Court’s 
separate analyses concerning the constitutionality of blood and breath tests 
under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement.74  
1. Warrantless Breath Tests Deemed Constitutional 
 The Birchfield Court’s analysis of warrantless breath and blood testing 
centered on two distinct, yet interrelated concerns: (1) the invasiveness of 
the respective test75  and (2) the degree to which the accompanying samples 
could be preserved (and, relatedly, the private, hereditary material contained 
 
69 Id. at 2184. 
70 Id. at 2176 (referring to Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)).  
71 Id. at 2188 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 
(1999))). 
72 Id. at 2178–79 (citation omitted).  
73 Of course, these concerns qualify as compelling governmental interests, but an emphasis on this 
second pillar simply proves too much—of course, municipalities would always prefer that there be no 
warrant requirement (keeping in mind the various procedural hurdles and delays imposed by the warrant 
process). For the purposes of this Note, which seeks to compare the Birchfield Court’s central concern 
about DNA privacy and an individual’s right to their own genetic information with states’ warrantless 
taking of buccal swabs, the governmental interest is not in dispute; therefore, arguments contradicting 
the governmental interest are simply unfounded. For this reason, it is more important to frame the 
question (and following analysis) around Birchfield Pillar One—the right to privacy—and ask, instead: 
what is so compelling about this situation (i.e., roadside saliva testing) that law enforcement can 
circumvent the warrant requirement? Can the government provide granular reasons that there is 
something so pressing (whether it be exigency or some other “compelling need”) that they can search—
pursuant to probable cause—without first having to secure a warrant from a neutral magistrate?   
74 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176. 
75 Id. at 2176–77. 
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within those samples).76 First, in its analysis of the intrusiveness posed by a 
breathalyzer, the Court cited supporting case law “that breath tests do not 
‘implicat[e] significant privacy concerns,’”77 summarily dismissing 
petitioners’ arguments for a warrant requirement for breath testing. In its 
rather short analysis, the Court deemed the physical intrusion of a breath test 
“almost negligible”78 and refused to recognize a possessory interest in the 
air in one’s lungs.79 Accordingly, the Court found that the breathalyzer test 
itself was not excessively intrusive.80  
The Court then shifted its attention to the preservability of the “fruits” 
of a breath test. Weighing in favor of warrantless breath tests, said the Court, 
was the sheer impossibility that law enforcement could retain a sample (and, 
by extension, the DNA contained within that sample).81 In comparing 
breathalyzers and buccal swab samples, the Court noted: “[B]reath tests are 
capable of revealing only one bit of information, the amount of alcohol in 
the subject’s breath,”82 whereas buccal swabs (like those at issue in 
Maryland v. King) put law enforcement in possession of “a sample from 
which a wealth of additional, highly personal information could potentially 
be obtained.”83 Therefore, because breath tests do not leave police officers 
with a preservable sample, coupled with a breathalyzer’s insignificant 
intrusiveness, the Court held that warrantless breathalyzer tests are 
constitutionally permissible.84  
2. Warrantless Blood Tests Deemed Unconstitutional 
Having determined the constitutionality of warrantless breathalyzer 
testing, the Court—utilizing the same two factors in its analysis (intrusiveness 
and preservability)—ultimately held that warrantless blood tests are 
unconstitutional.85 First, in regard to the level of intrusion, the Court was 
cognizant of the fact that blood tests “require piercing the skin” and 
 
76 Id. at 2177. 
77 Id. at 2176 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)) (alteration in 
original). 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 2177 (“The air that humans exhale is not part of their bodies.”). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. (“A breath test . . . results in a BAC reading on a machine, nothing more.”). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 2177–78. For an interesting argument on the Birchfield decision, which contends that the 
majority’s holding regarding breath tests is a “misstep in Constitutional analysis,” see Catherine Norton, 
Comment, Keeping Faith with the Fourth Amendment: Why States Should Require a Warrant for 
Breathalyzer Tests in the Wake of Birchfield v. North Dakota, 87 MISS. L.J. 237, 258 (2018) (“First, the 
distinction between breath tests and blood tests is an arbitrary line that chips away at well-established 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Second, warrantless breath tests do not fall within the rationale of the 
search incident to arrest exception, and therefore cannot be justified under traditional search incident to 
arrest doctrine. Third, the significant privacy implications of breath tests outweigh the minimal burden 
that a warrant requirement would impose on the states.”).  
85 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178.  
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extracting a part of the person’s body.86 Other considerations noted by the 
majority included an individual’s limited supply of blood (as compared to the 
air exhaled from human lungs), the unpleasantness of the blood-draw process, 
and the degree of intrusiveness as compared to blowing into a breathalyzer.87  
Arguably, most interesting in its analysis was the Court’s almost 
palpable concern regarding the preservation and potential misuse of the 
blood sample. The majority wrote:  
[A] blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the hands of law 
enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and 
from which it is possible to extract information beyond a 
simple BAC reading. Even if the law enforcement agency is 
precluded from testing the blood for any purpose other than to 
measure BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety 
for the person tested.88 
Here, the Court recognized the potential for abuse surrounding 
warrantless blood draws. Though law enforcement may insist that a sample 
will only be used for a single purpose (in this case, to measure levels of 
cannabis impairment), DNA collected for one purpose has the potential to 
be used for another distinct, unrelated purpose.89 Additionally, if a person’s 
genetic profile is created in a state or federal database, the “person can be 
implicated in future crimes and will constantly be compared to crime scene 
DNA samples, which some have referred to as lifelong ‘genetic 
surveillance.’”90 Recognizing these dangers (in addition to the level of 
intrusion inherent in a blood test), the majority wrote that the reasonableness 
of a blood test must be judged in light of the availability of a “less invasive 
alternative”: the breath test.91 Because respondents were not able to offer 
adequate reasons for requiring a more intrusive alternative absent a warrant, 
nor did they dispute the effectiveness of breath tests in measuring BAC, the 
Court concluded that blood tests may not be administered absent a warrant.92 
Simply put, “[b]ecause breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood 
tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests,” the Court 
concluded that breath tests, but not blood tests, can be administered without 
a warrant as a search-incident-to-arrest for drunk driving.93 
 
86 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)).  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See Lowenberg, supra note 51, at 1316–17 (noting that DNA collected for identification and 
medical screening has been used for research analyses). “Law enforcement is also analyzing DNA, which 
was originally collected for identification, to show familial relationships.” Id. at 1317. 
90 Id. at 1317 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2009, 4:52 
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/03/genetic-surveillance-for-all.html).   
91 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.  
92 Id. at 2184–85. 
93 Id. at 2185. 
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III. A SOLUTION OR YET ANOTHER PROBLEM? THE ARGUMENT AGAINST 
WARRANTLESS ROADSIDE SALIVA SWAB TESTING 
Though warrantless saliva testing has not yet faced a constitutional 
challenge, its implementation has sparked concerns among commentators 
who recognize its potential for constitutional violations.94 In fact, a 
representative of the National Motorists Association (NMA), in response to 
Michigan’s implementation of the roadside testing program, went so far as 
to describe the saliva swab tests as “one of the most invasive methods of 
drug testing in the country,” as “the test violates the [Fourth] Amendment.”95 
Despite identifiable constitutional uncertainties, states continue to 
implement saliva swab testing programs at the expense of drivers’ civil 
liberties and, in particular, Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees. According 
to the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Public Safety, Thomas 
Anderson, the question of whether the saliva testing should require a warrant 
should be left to the courts, who “are uniquely qualified to make that 
determination.”96 It is my contention that the Birchfield Court, based on its 
predominant concern for informational privacy, would resoundingly answer 
that a warrant is required prior to conducting a saliva swab test.  
A. The Fourth Amendment Concerns: Saliva is More Like “Blood” Than 
“Breath” 
Proceeding with the Birchfield decision as a framework for analysis, this 
Part advances the argument that saliva testing is more akin to blood testing 
than it is to breath testing.97 Inherent in saliva testing are the same two 
 
94 See White, supra note 6 (noting that roadside saliva testing poses “serious due process and equal 
protection concerns,” as “[r]oadside stops are considered seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and 
many factors contribute to whether or not a given seizure is legitimate”); Chloé White, Roadside Saliva 
Testing Violates Civil Liberties and Offends Common Sense. Why is the Vermont Legislature Talking 
About it Again?, ACLU VT. (Feb. 1, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.acluvt.org/en/news/roadside-saliva-
testing-violates-civil-liberties-and-offends-common-sense-why-vermont (arguing that Vermont’s 
proposed bill to implement saliva testing raises Due Process concerns and positing that “[s]aliva testing 
without a warrant is an infringement on personal privacy”). 
95 Steph Willems, Michigan’s Roadside Drug-Testing Program Violates Constitutional Rights, Say 
Advocates, TTAC (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2016/08/michigans-roadside-
drug-testing-program-violates-constitutional-rights-say-advocates/ (noting the potential evidentiary 
problems raised by saliva testing, quoting the NMA as saying that “a good saliva or oral fluid device to 
test for the presence of key drugs are not yet of evidential quality apparently”). “Because of the . . . 
apparent constitutional overreach, the NMA calls on Michigan to classify the saliva test on the same level 
as a blood test,” meaning to require that law enforcement obtain a warrant before performing the buccal 
swab test. Id. 
96 Alan J. Keays, Warrant Requirement for Saliva Testing Gets Cool Reception from Scott 
Administration, VTDIGGER (Apr. 25, 2019), https://vtdigger.org/2019/04/25/warrant-requirement-
saliva-testing-gets-cool-reception-scott-administration/ (“‘The only question is whether [saliva swab 
testing] should be done with a warrant or without a warrant . . . that is a legitimate question,’ Anderson 
testified Thursday before the House Judiciary Committee. ‘To me, the courts are the ones that are 
uniquely qualified to make that determination . . . .’”).  
97 But see John Flannigan, Stephen K. Talpins & Christine Moore, Oral Fluid Testing for Impaired 
Driving Enforcement, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 2017, at 58, 61 (“[I]t is probable that the court will treat oral 
fluid drug testing the same way it has treated oral fluid DNA testing and breath testing. In other words, 
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concerns that worried the Birchfield Court in its Fourth Amendment analysis 
of warrantless blood testing: (1) saliva testing is intrusive, and (2) saliva tests 
provide law enforcement with a sample that can be preserved. These shared 
concerns (present in both blood and saliva testing) lead to the conclusion 
that warrantless saliva testing, particularly prior to arrest, would be ruled 
unconstitutional should it face constitutional scrutiny. 
1. More Intrusive Than a Breath Test? 
Though admittedly less intrusive than a blood test, which inevitably 
requires the piercing of skin, a buccal swab test is nevertheless invasive, 
especially when compared to a breath test.98 First, a saliva test requires an 
officer to insert a swab into a person’s mouth, thereby compromising an 
individual’s bodily integrity.99 A breathalyzer, by contrast, does not require 
entrance into the body. Additionally, saliva tests require “physical removal 
of oral fluids and DNA,”100 just as a blood test requires extraction of blood. 
A breath test, however, does not entail the physical taking of a part of one’s 
body. In fact, the Court has refused to recognize an individual’s possessory 
interest in air exhaled from the lungs.101 But comparatively, a possessory 
interest in bodily fluids has been recognized.102 If, as this Note presumes, the 
Birchfield Court was worried about both bodily integrity and the extraction 
of fluids in which an individual has a possessory interest, saliva is more 
analogous to blood than to breath. 
2. Saliva Testing Creates a Sample that can be Preserved: 
Informational Dynamics and DNA Privacy 
Leaning on Pillar One of the Birchfield decision, entrenched in the 
Birchfield majority’s analysis of the constitutionality of warrantless blood and 
breath testing is its underlying concern surrounding informational dynamics 
and DNA privacy. In comparing blood and breath tests, the Court gave 
considerable weight to the fact that breath tests do not create a sample ridden 
 
it appears that law enforcement officers may obtain oral fluid samples for drug testing without needing 
to obtain a warrant, and states may pass laws criminalizing oral fluid test refusals.”). 
98 DUID—Driving Under the Influence of Drugs Just Took a Turn: NMA E-Newsletter #394, NAT’L 
MOTORISTS ASS’N (July 31, 2016), https://www.motorists.org/alerts/duid-driving-under-the-influence-
of-drugs-just-took-a-turn-nma-e-newsletter-394/ (describing one state’s saliva swab testing plan as “one 
of the most invasive methods of drug testing in the country”). 
99 Contra Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 
(1985)) (“A buccal swab is a far more gentle process than a venipuncture to draw blood. It involves but 
a light touch on the inside of the cheek; and although it can be deemed a search within the body of the 
arrestee, it requires no ‘surgical intrusions beneath the skin.’”). 
100 White, supra note 6. 
101 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (2016). 
102 Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 n.4 (1989) (“Taking a blood or urine 
sample might also be characterized as a Fourth Amendment seizure, since it may be viewed as a 
meaningful interference with the employee’s possessory interest in his bodily fluids.” (citing United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984))).  
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with information,103 but strongly emphasized the wealth of information 
contained within a blood sample.104 The Court noted the potential for abuse of 
that private, identifying information contained in a blood sample105 and the 
lack of a comparable potential for abuse present in a simple breath test. 
Like a blood test, DNA can be extracted from saliva106 and later 
preserved via the buccal test swab. From that sample, additional information 
can be determined, “including the person’s entire genome.”107 According to 
some scholars, this considerable invasion of privacy should require 
additional safeguards beyond probable cause108—namely, the requirement 
of a warrant because of (1) the sacredness of an individual’s identifying 
information contained within their DNA and (2) the potential for later abuse 
by law enforcement.  
i. DNA: A Wealth of Information 
First, to emphasize the importance of DNA privacy, it is necessary to 
understand the volume of information contained within an individual’s 
unique DNA profile and the ways in which law enforcement can use—and 
potentially exploit—that information. DNA contains hereditary material and 
genes—the things that make a person individually unique.109 These 
identifying features of DNA are particularly useful in the legal system, as 
DNA typing technology can be used to apprehend offenders.110 For instance, 
law enforcement officers can compare the DNA of a known person to DNA 
left at a crime scene by an unknown, unidentified offender. In the past decade 
alone, DNA evidence has advanced to identify criminals with incredible 
accuracy,111 even with infinitesimal amounts of biological material.112  
Expectedly, the advancements in and opportunities presented by DNA 
 
103 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177 (“[B]reath tests are capable of revealing only one bit of 
information, the amount of alcohol in the subject’s breath.”). 
104 Id. at 2178. 
105 Id. 
106 Andrei Nedelcu, Note, Blood and Privacy: Towards a “Testing-As-Search” Paradigm Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 195, 214 (2015) (noting that DNA can be derived from 
a host of sources, including blood and saliva) (footnote omitted).  
107 Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Anxiety, 55 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2018). See also Lowenberg, supra note 51, at 1293–98 (explaining how variations in DNA, 
an information-rich material contained in every cell in our bodies, stores information about a subject’s 
identity, genealogy, and phenotype).  
108 Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 107, at 12 (“This potentially massive privacy 
invasion might be guarded against by laws . . . that restrict the extraction of such information.”). 
109 Jill Seladi-Schulman, DNA Explained and Explored, HEALTHLINE (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.healthline.com/health/what-is-dna#what-is-dna.  
110 COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RSCH. COUNS., DNA TECHNOLOGY IN 
FORENSIC SCIENCE 142–43 (1992). 
111 Using DNA to Solve Crimes, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag
/advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes (last updated Mar. 7, 2017).  
112 Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated World of State and 
Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639, 643 (2014) (“The biological properties of 
DNA make it an ideal piece of evidence for police to focus on when investigating crime. Only a miniscule 
amount of biological material is needed to produce the DNA profile that law enforcement uses to compare 
crime scene DNA to DNA collected from a known person.”).  
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technology prompted law enforcement to expand the collection and 
preservation of DNA samples from individuals and crime scenes.113 The 
expansion commenced with the creation of the Combined DNA Index 
System (CODIS), a national and state database of convicted offenders and 
arrestees.114 But as the aphorism often attributed to Voltaire famously stated, 
“with great power comes great responsibility.” Arguably, federal and state 
governments, equipped with the “great power” of DNA, have not held up 
their end of the bargain. Despite Congress’s initial objective of collecting 
DNA of individuals convicted of a limited set of felonies, DNA samples can 
now be collected from a wider range of offenders than ever before.115  
While the expansion of CODIS has been integral in apprehending guilty 
offenders,116 the rapid growth of DNA collection is worrisome, particularly in 
the context of saliva swab testing. If law enforcement has a blatant interest in 
the collection of DNA (and in the expansion of DNA databases), will the court 
find itself increasingly willing to allow for warrantless saliva testing? Or, 
alternatively, are the courts the entity uniquely situated to take on the “great 
responsibility,” illustrated by the court’s exclusive power to issue warrants?117 
ii. Potential for Abuse: A Far-Fetched Reality or Recognized 
Truth? 
Second, on the topic of potential abuses, the same preservability 
concerns contemplated by the Birchfield Court exist with roadside saliva 
tests. Law enforcement officers could easily collect the saliva sample from 
a buccal swab and use it for other, potentially illegitimate, purposes, a reality 
(at least implicitly) contemplated by the Birchfield majority.118 In this realm 
of possibilities, a saliva sample could be used by law enforcement “to 
reliably compare the genetic profile of a known person with a genetic profile 
left at a crime scene by an unknown individual”119 or for collection and 
 
113 Id. at 647. 
114 Id. For more information on CODIS, which is beyond the purview of this Note, see DNA 
Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2000) (codifying congressional 
authorization to create a CODIS database for DNA samples). 
115 Mercer & Gabel, supra note 112, at 652 (“In 2000, Congress . . . required DNA collection and 
analysis from individuals convicted of a limited set of federal offenses. Congress extended that 
requirement in 2004 to all individuals convicted of federal felonies. In 2004, Congress expressly 
permitted the FBI to accept into the national DNA databank DNA profiles of arrested individuals. In 
2005 and 2006, Congress extended federal DNA testing to all arrestees. Similarly, today all fifty states 
require DNA collection from all individuals convicted of felonies, and twenty-eight states require DNA 
collection and analysis from at least some arrestees.”). 
116 Valerie Ross, Forget Fingerprints: Law Enforcement DNA Databases Poised to Expand, NOVA 
(Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/dna-databases/. 
117 See discussion infra Section III.C (discussing how warrants “help” the reliability problem). 
118 See Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 107, at 11 (“[T]he Court is effectively saying 
that legal ‘preclusion’ of subsequent use of the blood sample does not suffice to extinguish the anxiety 
that accompanies collection. In other words, the ‘potential’ imagined by the Court is the potential of 
unauthorized testing . . . . Why is this so radical? Because judges are not normally in the business of 
protecting citizens against potential intrusions of privacy that are already prohibited by law.”). 
119 Nedelcu, supra note 106, at 214 (footnote omitted).  
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storage in a DNA database, like CODIS.120 Without a warrant requirement 
to safeguard such integrally private information against possible police 
indiscretions, there is simply no limit to the number of samples law 
enforcement could obtain, particularly those extracted under the auspices of 
a “routine DUID stop.”121  
Essentially, if the Birchfield majority’s true worry about warrantless 
blood testing was improper and unfettered access to DNA, as well as the 
potential for misuse of a DNA sample, saliva swab testing presents identical 
concerns. For these reasons, in order to comply with constitutional 
requirements, as stated by Birchfield, law enforcement should be required to 
procure a warrant before performing a saliva test. 
B. Addressing Counterarguments 
1. What About Maryland v. King? 
One potential source of confusion (and surface-level “ripple”) in this 
Birchfield framework is the Supreme Court’s Maryland v. King decision. In 
King, the Court held that taking a cheek swab to verify a person’s identity 
through DNA testing is a legitimate booking procedure and, therefore, 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment, even absent a warrant.122 To 
reach its conclusion, the Court employed the traditional Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness analysis in order to ultimately determine whether the 
collection of DNA (via buccal swab) of those arrested for a serious crime 
violated the Fourth Amendment.123 The Court found that although swabbing 
an arrestee’s cheek constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, both the minimal intrusion and an arrestee’s diminished 
expectation of privacy—coupled with the strong government interest in 
identifying arrestees—weighed strongly in favor of collecting DNA samples.124  
On the surface, King may be of use to proponents of warrantless saliva 
testing, as it suggests that once an individual is arrested, law enforcement 
has the power to engage in—what it termed—a “minimal” bodily intrusion 
that is authorized for purposes of identification during an arrest. 
Additionally, potentially hopeful for buccal swab proponents, in King, the 
government succeeded in convincing the Court that there were persuasive 
reasons to allow it to collect DNA samples absent a warrant.125 Though a 
 
120 Id. “Even where an individual is never prosecuted or convicted of a crime, a significant number 
of states now have statutory schemes authorizing the warrantless DNA sampling of certain arrestees.” 
Id. at 215.  
121 See discussion infra Section III.D.2 (discussing the Equal Protection concerns raised by 
warrantless saliva swab testing).  
122 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013). Note that it is the Court’s holding in King that 
underlies Flannigan, Talpins, and Moore’s argument that the Court will treat saliva testing like breath 
testing. Flannigan, Talpins & Moore, supra note 97, at 61.  
123 King, 569 U.S. at 461. 
124 Id. at 462–64. 
125 Id. at 465–66.  
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Maryland v. King-style argument might have been compelling immediately 
post-King, there are important distinctions, particularly post-Birchfield, that 
would preempt a proponent of saliva testing from advancing such an argument.  
At a foundational level, because warrantless saliva swab testing is 
generally conducted prior to a valid arrest, the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable.126 The King holding 
applies to arrestees, whereas warrantless roadside saliva testing is generally 
conducted as part of a field sobriety test, before an individual has been 
apprehended and before there is sufficient evidence to arrest.127 Because the 
saliva swab precedes an arrest, King is largely unusable to proponents of 
warrantless saliva testing; because the buccal swabs are taken before a valid 
arrest, the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement is 
inapplicable, and the government must offer some other well-delineated 
exception to the warrant requirement to justify its search and seizure. 
However, even if states were to conduct the saliva swab testing 
post-arrest, it is the Birchfield Court’s concern about DNA privacy and 
protection of informational dynamics—a concern ironically shared by 
Justice Scalia in his Maryland v. King dissent128—that precludes the 
government from using any Maryland v. King-style argument to attempt to 
circumvent the warrant requirement. Because of the Birchfield Court’s 
worries about unchecked police access to DNA information,129 any potential 
expansion of Maryland v. King to extend the circumvention of the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement (to individuals undergoing a field sobriety 
test, or those stopped at a routine traffic stop, or any other similar 
permutation) would be irreconcilable with Birchfield. After Birchfield, 
where the distinction between blood and breath tests largely boiled down to 
the preservability of the sample and potential for misuse of that sample, the 
Court would likely be unwilling to allow yet another exception to the 
warrant requirement where, again, law enforcement could collect a sample 
that can be preserved and has the potential to be exploited by the government.  
 
126 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118–19 (1998) (adopting a “bright-line rule” that the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies only when there is an actual arrest). 
127 It is for this reason that I contend Flannigan, Talpins, and Moore misinterpreted the Maryland 
v. King decision by conflating “taking a cheek swab to verify a person’s identity through DNA testing” 
with an oral saliva test conducted as part of a field sobriety test. Flannigan, Talpins & Moore, supra note 
97, at 61.  
128 Justice Scalia’s dissent interestingly foreshadows some of the Court’s concerns in Birchfield. 
Justice Scalia takes issue with the majority’s elaboration of the ways in which the DNA sample served 
the special purpose of “identifying” King, but for Justice Scalia, that “identifying” was really “searching 
for evidence that [King] ha[d] committed crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest.” King, 569 U.S. at 
469–70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Searching every lawfully stopped car, for example, might turn up 
information about unsolved crimes the driver had committed, but no one would say that such a search 
was aimed at ‘identifying’ him, and no court would hold such a search lawful.”). Justice Scalia argued 
that the government’s primary purpose was not “identification” at all, as the actual DNA testing at issue 
in King did not begin until after arraignment and bail decisions were already made. Id. at 475–76.   
129 See discussion supra Section III.A.2 (detailing the Birchfield Court’s concerns surrounding 
warrantless blood testing).  
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2. What About Exigency?: Arguing for a Categorical Rule 
A common concern among law enforcement, understandably, is the 
reliability and probativeness of evidence. Clearly, in the majority of DUI 
and DUID cases, time is of the essence, as both alcohol and active THC 
levels dissipate over time.130 However, as discussed in a previous section, 
the chemical properties of cannabis render the exigency argument much less 
persuasive and even, perhaps, unworkable.131  
Nevertheless, assuming an exigency argument can actually be made, this 
style of argument is preempted post-Birchfield (and even post-McNeely).132 
The exigency argument posed by the evanescence of alcohol and drugs cannot 
stand to justify a per se rule. Still, the exigent circumstances “carve out,” 
where the Court reasoned that a warrantless search is permissible “when an 
emergency leaves police insufficient time to seek a warrant,”133 persists. 
However, in the realm of warrantless saliva testing, this exception would only 
apply to a narrow subset of unique cases, further solidifying the “exigent 
circumstances exception”134 as just that, an exception, not the universal rule. 
C. Warrants and the Reliability Problem: Why are Warrants Important? 
Having laid out the Fourth Amendment analysis and Birchfield 
framework, yet before proceeding onward to the “solution,” we must shift 
the discussion and unpack the “why” behind the warrant requirement. 
Namely, why are warrants so important, and why do they help the 
“reliability” problem? What is it about the procurement of a warrant that 
 
130 See Alcohol (BAC, Gender, etc), AAA, https://duijusticelink.aaa.com/for-the-public/get-
educated/alcohol/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2020) (“On average, BAC is eliminated from the body at a rate of 
.015–.017% per hour.”); Priyamvada Sharma, Pratima Murthy & M.M. Srinivas Bharath, Chemistry, 
Metabolism, and Toxicology of Cannabis: Clinical Implications, 7 IRANIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 149, 151–52 
(2012) (noting that the concentration of delta-tetrahydrocannabinol, the most psychoactive component 
of cannabis, “decreases to 1-4 ng/mL within 3-4 hour[s]”).  
131 For more detail on the chemical properties of cannabis, including information about its fat 
solubility, see discussion supra Section I.A.  
132 In McNeely, the Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream does not 
always constitute an exigency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample. Missouri v. McNeely, 
569 U.S. 141, 165 (2013). Though the Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), had 
previously deemed constitutional the warrantless taking of a blood sample from a defendant suspected 
of driving under the influence, the McNeely Court carefully cautioned that this does not mean that the 
warrantless taking of a blood draw is always constitutionally permissible, thereby rejecting a categorical 
rule. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152. Accordingly, in circumstances where law enforcement can reasonably 
obtain a warrant before a blood sample, “the Fourth Amendment [requires] that they do so.” Id. The 
McNeely Court also recognized the array of changes since Schmerber was decided. Id. at 154–55 (noting 
that federal magistrate judges can consider information communicated by phone to issue a warrant; states 
have innovated to allow law enforcement or prosecutors to “apply for search warrants remotely through 
. . . telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video conferencing”; 
and jurisdictions have found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using form warrant 
applications for drunk driving cases).  
133 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 
499, 509 (1978)).  
134 Id. at 2173. 
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eases our concerns about police misconduct? And even more fundamentally, 
why is it so important to advocate for a warranted roadside saliva test?  
The answer to these questions primarily lies in the constitutional 
requisite that a warrant may only be issued by a “neutral and detached 
magistrate” capable of determining whether probable cause exists.135 
Naturally divorced from the situation, the judge can appropriately determine 
whether or not probable cause exists, sufficient to justify the issuing of the 
desired warrant. Aptly put by the Court in Johnson v. United States: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable 
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that 
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.136  
The warrant requirement, in effect, acts as a “check” on law enforcement, a 
check necessary to ensure neutrality, objectivity,137 and accuracy (meaning 
that sufficient evidence exists to permit the sought-after search).   
Particular to the case of saliva swab testing, warrants ease the worry that 
law enforcement might swab an alleged DUID suspect for improper, illicit 
reasons or obtain a driver’s DNA sample with the purpose of later misusing 
it. Because an officer needs probable cause before submitting a warrant 
application, it is presumed that law enforcement will have a sufficient belief, 
based on actual evidence, that a motorist is under the influence. We hope 
that a law enforcement officer would not submit a frivolous request before 
a magistrate.138 But even if the officer did submit a warrant application 
without sufficient basis, it is the “check” of the warrant requirement that 
ensures that the neutral magistrate will not issue the warrant.  
Additionally, the warrant requirement helps ensure that police use the 
desired saliva swab for its true purpose—identifying whether an individual 
is impaired—as there must be a “nexus . . . between the item to be seized 
and the criminal behavior.”139 Officers cannot request a saliva sample at a 
routine DUID stop for the purposes of obtaining a DNA sample to run 
through CODIS, for example. The nexus requirement, too, is bolstered by 
the particularity requirement (namely, that the warrant must describe the 
 
135 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).  
136 Id. 
137 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) (noting that the warrant requirement is 
necessary because law enforcement “may lack sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of 
the evidence supporting the contemplated action against the individual’s interests in protecting his own 
liberty . . . .”). 
138 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1964) (noting that an officer’s own suspicions or 
beliefs, by themselves, are not sufficient to establish probable cause). 
139 The Warrant Requirement, 46 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 26 (2017) (quoting Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)). 
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place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized),140 effectively 
safeguarding drivers “against ‘the wide-ranging exploratory searches the 
Framers . . . intended to prohibit.’”141  
And finally, in the modern world, where the uses of DNA span the gamut 
and continue to grow, it is important to secure and enforce our rights to our 
genetic information. Allowing the government to effectively chip away at 
these rights—through warrantless saliva tests or the like—allows for 
governmental intrusion into a private sphere deserving of Fourth Amendment 
protection. Fighting for a warrant prior to roadside saliva testing is imperative, 
as the fight demonstrates to our leaders that there must be a “check” before 
police can essentially take and preserve a driver’s genetic profile.  
D. Associated Problems with Saliva Swab Testing: A Brief Survey 
Beyond Fourth Amendment privacy concerns, commentators have 
noted a wide range of potential issues when it comes to warrantless roadside 
saliva testing. The following section will consist of a brief survey of some 
of these trepidations, including issues with the reliability of the testing 
devices (and accompanying evidentiary concerns surrounding the roadside 
test’s ability to pass Daubert),142 as well as potential Equal Protection 
violations exacerbated by the circumvention of the warrant requirement. 
1. Unreliability Concerns Spawn Evidentiary Concerns 
Researchers have raised concerns over the reliability of roadside saliva 
testing.143 A study conducted by the University of Sydney found that THC 
testing devices often failed to detect high amounts of THC but sometimes 
produced positive readings for exceptionally low levels of THC.144 The 
study, which examined two commonly used saliva testing devices in 
Australia, found that the tests yielded both false positives and negatives at 
significant rates.145 The Draeger DrugTest 5000, one of the two saliva testing 
devices utilized in the United States, produced false positive readings (when 
 
140 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2) (“[T]he warrant must identify the person or property to be searched, 
identify any person or property to be seized, and designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned.”). 
141 The Warrant Requirement, supra note 139, at 33 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 
84 (1987)).  
142 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
143 In fact, the Vermont legislature recently rejected a bill which would allow police officers to 
conduct warrantless roadside saliva tests on DUID suspects, largely because the “saliva tests have been 
proven to be only partially effective.” Xander Landen, Vt. House Rejects Warrantless Saliva Tests, 
Defying Scott’s Terms for Legal Pot Market, VALLEY NEWS (Feb. 28, 2020, 10:33 PM), 
https://www.vnews.com/Vermont-House-rejects-warrantless-saliva-tests-defying-Scott-s-terms-for-
legal-pot-market-33000369. Representative Nader Hashim, an opponent of the bill, commented, 
“Vermonters aren’t guinea pigs to try out new tools that have not been accepted by the wider scientific 
community.” Id. 
144 Sarah Keoghan, Mobile Cannabis Tests on Drivers Gave Inaccurate Results, Researchers Say, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 12, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/mobile-
cannabis-tests-on-drivers-gave-inaccurate-results-researchers-say-20190912-p52qm6.html (noting that 
senior author of the study, Iain McGregor, deemed the devices “wildly inaccurate”). 
145 Id. 
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THC concentrations were very low or negligible) 10% of the time and a false 
negative result 9% of the time.146 A review of a Michigan county’s saliva 
testing pilot program revealed similar concerns.147 Despite accolades 
concluding the roadside instruments “performed well,” the roadside tests 
sometimes showed the presence of drugs that were not present in the 
follow-up blood tests.148 Specifically, this phenomenon occurred in eleven 
of the seventy-four tests for active THC.149 
Further, according to the researchers from the University of Sydney 
study,150 whether a cannabis user tests positive roadside might also depend 
on the make-up of the individual’s saliva.151 This poses a serious problem 
for assessing the tests’ reliability. Remarkably, researchers observed that a 
user might avoid a positive THC reading by the manner in which they use 
their drugs.152 According to Professor Iain McGregor, the senior author of 
the study, “[i]f [someone] were to take THC capsules, then no THC goes 
into [the] saliva; it just goes straight into . . . [the] bloodstream. . . . [A user] 
could take 10 of these and be completely intoxicated with THC and it 
wouldn’t come up in [a] saliva [swab test].”153  
These inaccuracy concerns elucidate yet another problem with roadside 
saliva testing. If the test is inaccurate in testing for the presence of THC, and 
if there is no scientifically reliable, standard level of THC in the body that 
can be associated with driver impairment,154 what purpose does the roadside 
saliva test actually serve? 
Unreliability problems surrounding the testing devices are not only 
problematic on a surface level, but also on an evidentiary level, like whether 
the roadside testing devices meet the Daubert evidentiary standard. Among 
other factors, when determining whether a methodology is valid, a court may 
 
146 Id. The other device tested was the Securetec DrugWipe, which gave a false positive reading 5% 
of the time and gave a false negative reading 16% of the time. Id. 
147 See generally Amy Biolchini, Marijuana Most Prevalent Drug in Michigan Roadside Testing, 
Police Find, MLIVE (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/2019/02/marijuana-most-prevalent-
drug-in-michigan-roadside-testing-police-find.html (describing the results of Washtenaw County’s 
roadside saliva test pilot program). See also Sean Boynton, Roadside Drug Testing Device Picks Up 
False Positives from Poppy Seeds and Tea, B.C. Lawyers Find, GLOBAL NEWS (May 5, 2019, 7:00 PM), 
https://globalnews.ca/news/5242672/drager-roadside-tester-false-positives/ (reporting a Canadian study 
that found that the Drager was unable to differentiate between THC, the psychoactive component of 
cannabis, and CBD, the non-psychoactive component used for medical treatment and pain relief).  
148 Biolchini, supra note 147.  
149 Id. The same occurred in six of the sixteen tests for amphetamines, in two of the seven tests for 
cocaine, and in one of the three tests for methamphetamines. Id. 
150 For more information on the study, see Thomas R. Arkell, Richard C. Kevin, Jordyn Stuart, 
Nicholas Lintzeris, Paul S. Haber, Johannes G. Ramaekers & Iain S. McGregor, Detection of Δ9 THC in 
Oral Fluid Following Vaporized Cannabis with Varied Cannabidiol (CBD) Content: An Evaluation of 
Two Point-of-Collection Testing Devices, 11 DRUG TESTING & ANALYSIS 1486 (2019), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/dta.2687. 
151 Keoghan, supra note 144. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 See discussion supra Section I.A (discussing the uniqueness of THC and its metabolization in 
the body, coupled with gaps in research, which pose problems for states that endeavor to create some 
type of standard).  
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consider: whether the methodology has been tested, whether it has been 
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential rate of error 
of the method, the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
method’s operation, and its general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community.155 Using these factors as a framework, it is clear that saliva 
testing may face trouble with the courts. The reported error rate, mentioned 
above, coupled with the lack of an agreed-upon scientific standard 
(preventing the maintenance of standards), are just some of the associated 
Daubert concerns.  
2. Equal Protection Concerns 
Another common concern surrounding warrantless saliva swab testing 
is the potential for covert Equal Protection violations. On one hand, because 
the saliva tests will also detect commonly prescribed medications (like 
anti-depressants and pain management medicines), they may result in 
prolonged interrogations, searches, and seizures of drivers with disabilities 
or mental health conditions.156 Commentators note that “[t]his is the essence 
of disparate and unequal treatment – people with any presence of those 
particular drugs in their system are always going to be seized for a longer 
time, no matter their actual impairment.”157  
From a racial justice perspective, warrantless saliva testing poses 
additional problems, as people of color are more likely to be stopped than 
white drivers.158 Therefore, more likely than not, people of color will be 
subjected to roadside testing at a disproportionate rate, as well.159 Scholars 
have noted that an officer’s own perceptions, usually based on the officer’s 
biases, are indicative of whether an officer will decide to stop a particular 
driver.160 Further, officers’ ability to stop individuals based on pretext “makes 
it easy for an officer to construct a legal basis of investigating virtually 
anyone in a vehicle because of the sheer scope of traffic regulations.”161  
For this reason, law enforcement often “use traffic stops to enforce laws 
unrelated to traffic violations, such as drug laws.”162 Accordingly, officers will 
stop drivers who fit within their preconceived notions of a “drug courier[],” 
 
155 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). 
156 White, supra note 6. 
157 Id. 
158 Id.; see also SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, 
AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 5 (2018) (“In recent years, black drivers have been somewhat more likely 
to be stopped than whites but have been far more likely to be searched and arrested. . . . [P]olice are more 
likely to stop black and Hispanic drivers for discretionary reasons—for ‘investigatory stops’ . . . . Once 
pulled over, black and Hispanic drivers were three times as likely as whites to be searched (6% and 7% 
versus 2%) and blacks were twice as likely as whites to be arrested.”).  
159 White, supra note 6. 
160 Rachel Cox, Note, Unethical Intrusion: The Disproportionate Impact of Law Enforcement DNA 
Sampling on Minority Populations, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 155, 163 (2015).  
161 Id. (internal quotations and footnote omitted).  
162 Id.  
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which may include racial classifications.163 The “stop” then effectively 
becomes an opportunity to conduct a warrantless search under the guise of 
a normal, routine traffic stop. In sum, warrantless roadside tests effectively 
broaden police search and arrest powers, thereby increasing the chance that 
racial disparities in traffic stops, searches, and arrests will persist and worsen.  
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: EMBRACING CREATIVITY AND MOVING 
TOWARDS INNOVATION 
Having established the array of potential problems posed by warrantless 
roadside saliva swab testing, the question remains—how can states 
apprehend suspected drugged drivers while simultaneously complying with 
constitutional mandates? The answer to that question involves a dynamic 
shift—a paradigmatic change in how we think about the Fourth 
Amendment—complemented by a general movement toward innovation.  
A. The Drawbacks of Probable Cause Formalism & Moving Towards a 
Holistic Reasonableness Analysis 
Generally, when analyzing, post hoc, whether a given warrantless search 
was justified, courts engage in the standard probable cause analysis. Per the 
analysis, when reviewing a warrantless search or seizure, the court will 
determine whether the respective search or seizure was carried out “upon a 
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing 
officer”164—namely, upon a belief of probable cause. So, if law 
enforcement can articulate a justifiable reason for conducting a search or 
seizure—notwithstanding whether it is a “good” reason—the search or 
seizure will stand.  
This formalistic framework is problematic. Professor Josh Bowers, in 
calling for a “two-ply . . . reasonableness test” in place of the legalistic 
probable cause analysis,165 raised one major problem with traditional 
probable cause doctrine: its capacity to provide a “safe harbor” for law 
enforcement.166 Professor Bowers wrote: 
[O]fficers with probable cause retain terrific discretion to 
choose when, whether, and how to act. . . . [P]robable cause . 
. . also empowers. . . . [It] thereby . . . produce[s] an identifiable 
domain of choice within which a law enforcer may “define the 
law” that he wishes to enforce. . . . [P]robable cause . . . 
 
163 Id.  
164 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).  
165 Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of 
a “Pointless Indignity”, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 995 (2014). Professor Bowers’s two-ply test requires that 
“an arrest . . . be supported by both probable cause and general reasonableness (with a fair, but not full, 
measure of deference to the arresting officer).” Id. 
166 Id. at 1031–32. 
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describe[s] “a means of insulating officials” from legal 
challenges to searches and seizures.167 
And, according to Professor Bowers, this wide exercise of law 
enforcement discretion is inadequately “checked” by the courts.168 Other 
commentators have recognized a need for more—beyond a showing of 
probable cause—to support a post hoc justification for a warrantless search 
or seizure, recognizing the dangers inherent in such an immense grant of law 
enforcement power. Professor William J. Mertens, for instance, cautioned 
that overly broad discretionary search and seizure power can be used to 
discriminate against people in ways that contradict both the constitutional 
order and public policy.169 Such latitude afforded to officers permits 
unreasonable searches and seizures, often offending “rights and values that 
are found outside the fourth amendment itself.”170  
Recognizing these dangers, consistent with the position advocated for 
by Professor Bowers, the true focus, the epicenter, of the Fourth Amendment 
analysis should be the “reasonableness” of the respective warrantless search 
and seizure. Professor Bowers envisions a two-ply test with a focus on 
reasonableness, requiring officers to provide just that: a reason. Under 
typical Fourth Amendment analysis, “probable cause means never having to 
give a reason.”171 But under Professor Bowers’s alternative approach, as part 
of the analysis, the officer would be required to provide “satisfactory 
qualitative reasons for the . . . action taken.”172 At minimum, at this juncture, 
an officer must communicate “a nonarbitrary reason for the peacekeeper’s 
action.”173 Though, here, there is certainly potential for abuse, the need to 
articulate a reason stands as, at minimum, a “check” on this relatively 
“unchecked” grant of law enforcement power. 
For the purposes of this Note, adopting the view that “reasonableness” 
is the appropriate framework for analyzing the constitutionality of Fourth 
Amendment practices, then the methods and techniques employed by police 
are equally as important as any one individual search and seizure. If we truly 
envision a Fourth Amendment analysis centered on reasonableness, then we, 
too, care about which technique—among those available—police use to carry 
out a given search or seizure. We care to ensure that the actual method—the 
procedure—is reasonable, or “nonarbitrary”174 or a product of “equitable 
discretion.”175 We care, as did the Court in Birchfield, about the least intrusive 
 
167 Id. at 1032–33 (footnotes omitted). 
168 Id. at 1033. 
169 William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 551, 564 (1984).  
170 Id. 
171 Bowers, supra note 165, at 1001.  
172 Id. at 1028.  
173 Id.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 1029. 
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means to the same end.176 And, as argued below, absent an existing solution, 
it is the duty of the legal innovator to come up with new, constitutionally 
permissible, “reasonable” solutions to the drugged driving epidemic.  
B. A Means to an End: Expanding Current Techniques and Encouraging 
Creativity 
Guided by the Birchfield Court, and Professor Bowers’s emphasis on 
the “reasonableness” of a given warrantless search and seizure, I hypothesize 
that the answer to the cannabis-impaired driving problem is threefold and 
involves the interposition of three things: (1) the maintenance and expansion 
of current procedures, (2) designated research, federally, and (3) a general 
movement towards innovation.  
Currently, states nationwide use a standard field sobriety test, the Drug 
Recognition Expert (DRE) protocol, to determine whether a DUID suspect 
is impaired.177 The DRE protocol is a twelve-step process including a breath 
test, an interview with the officer, an eye examination, and a series of 
psychophysical tests.178 DREs, who conduct these examinations, are 
specially trained officers who are qualified to identify signs of impairment 
in drivers who are under the influence of drugs.179 It is left to the discretion 
of the states and individual departments to decide how many DREs to 
employ, but the DOT advocates for all law enforcement personnel to receive 
training to help officers properly identify impaired drivers.180 One solution 
to apprehending drugged drivers, then, is to train more officers to become 
DRE-certified and recognize the signs of a drugged driver through the 
twelve-step DRE protocol. If an officer can quickly and efficiently make the 
determination that someone is impaired (and subsequently make a probable 
cause determination), they can expediently apply for a warrant to require the 
suspect to submit to a toxicological exam, which will provide reliable, 
admissible evidence to support the DRE’s opinion. Additionally, the DOT 
recommends developing a field sobriety test—a special iteration of the 
 
176 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) (“Because breath tests are significantly 
less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude that 
a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk 
driving.”) (emphasis added).  
177 12 Step Process, INT’L ASS’N CHIEFS POLICE, https://www.theiacp.org/12-step-process (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2020).  
178 Id. 
179 Drug Recognition Experts (DREs), INT’L ASS’N CHIEFS POLICE, https://www.theiacp.org/drug-
recognition-experts-dres (last visited Jan. 15, 2020).  
180 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN. & VOLPE 
NAT’L TRANSP. SYS. CTR., IMPACT OF THE LEGALIZATION AND DECRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA ON 
THE DWI SYSTEM 5 (2017), https://www.ghsa.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/ncrep_062617.pdf 
[hereinafter IMPACT OF LEGALIZATION]. The DOT emphasizes the importance in training in Standardized 
Field Sobriety Testing, Advanced Roadside Driving Enforcement, and Drug Evaluation and 
Classification. Id. 
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standardized twelve-step DRE protocol—specifically for cannabis,181 as 
cannabis impairment is largely distinctive from alcohol impairment.182  
One major impediment in the traditional twelve-step DRE protocol, as 
applied to cannabis impairment, is the absence of a breathalyzer equivalent 
for cannabis. Should a breathalyzer equivalent be developed to test for the 
presence of THC, the Birchfield privacy concerns would fall away, as the 
Court held that warrantless breath tests are constitutionally permissible. 
Luckily for Fourth Amendment advocates, scientists have been working to 
create a cannabis breathalyzer, which is expected to premiere in 2021.183 
According to Hound Labs, the device will show whether a driver had 
smoked weed in a three-hour period before driving.184 Whether or not the 
device will be able to detect levels of impairment, and, if so, how it will 
determine if a driver is impaired at that particular THC concentration, is 
unclear. However, these uncertainties and gaps in knowledge can only be 
rectified by more robust research. 
One major obstacle to states’ endeavors to conduct this “robust 
research” has, ironically, been the federal government. Because the federal 
government classifies cannabis as a Schedule I drug, research on cannabis 
or THC is “highly restricted” and even “discouraged” in some instances.185 
For this reason, scientists have been hindered in conducting high-quality 
research,186 a clear roadblock to proposing solutions to drugged driving. If 
there is any chance in regulating drugged driving—and informing the public 
on how to safely use cannabis (for instance, how long one must wait before 
using cannabis and subsequently driving)—more research must be devoted 
to the topic. State legislators must demand that the federal government 
address this pressing issue before it becomes a true nationwide crisis. 
Finally, and relatedly, researchers have noted the wide array of problems 
surrounding the regulation of cannabis. Its chemical properties, coupled with 
its varied effect on individual users, have posed challenges for scientists, as 
well as for states that have attempted to develop a per se level of impairment. 
However, these challenges should not deter scientists and lawmakers alike 
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from developing a cannabis DUID solution. It is the job of the lawyer, the 
policymaker, and the scientist to move towards a world of innovation and 
not to shy away from creative solutions. The Birchfield Court’s message in 
steering law enforcement towards “less intrusive” means is part of the broader 
principle—a principle that the law should strive for creative solutions despite 
the surrounding growing pains. Though the regulation of cannabis-impaired 
driving may be difficult today, continued education and research will 
inevitably lead to new solutions. And it is the duty of the courts, in this quest 
for knowledge, to hold law enforcement accountable—to remind officers that 
law enforcement convenience is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment 
question—and to encourage creativity despite an arduous road ahead. 
CONCLUSION 
While roadside safety is undoubtedly an important state interest, and 
drugged driving is a problem that needs to be addressed, warrantless 
roadside saliva testing is not the solution. Though certainly alluring in some 
respects, the “appeal” of warrantless saliva tests is outweighed by the tests’ 
fundamental erosion of individuals’ Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees. 
Warrantless saliva swab tests are riddled with problems—from reliability 
concerns (namely, the potential for inaccurate readings) to an array of 
practical legal issues, including evidentiary and Equal Protection concerns. 
Most egregiously, however, warrantless saliva swab testing runs afoul of the 
Birchfield Court’s central concerns about informational privacy and the 
potential for police misuse of DNA obtained without a warrant.  
As a final response to the inevitable “combatting drugged driving is an 
important state interest” argument, I am reminded of the Court’s words in 
Maryland v. King: “Urgent government interests are not a license for 
indiscriminate police behavior.”187  
Extending this logic to the saliva swab testing context before us, it 
becomes apparent that the “urgency” of the drugged driving problem does 
not justify the sacrifice of a driver’s constitutional, civil, and informational 
rights, a sacrifice that cannot be divorced from warrantless saliva swab testing. 
If states are to truly work towards a solution to address cannabis-impaired 
driving, it is innovation and education that stand as the greatest sources of 
promise. And ultimately, it is the duty of the courts to ensure that—in pursuit 
of apprehending drugged drivers—law enforcement heed the Court’s 
admonition in King and ensure that the “appeal” of warrantless saliva swab 
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